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Our symposium topic, "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the
Administrative Agencies," reflects the fact that the Constitution fails
to answer some fundamental questions about the modem adminis-
trative state. Ambiguity surrounds the constitutional relationships
among the three branches of government, and between the
branches and the agencies.' The persistence of disquiet and sympo-
sia about these issues suggest that the status quo is undesirable and
that reduction of ambiguity would enhance the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative state.2 Although our written Constitution, even with its
judicial gloss, provides only a skeleton for the organization of gov-
ernment, I argue here that no more detailed anatomy is necessary or
desirable at the constitutional level.3 Instead, statutory and com-
mon law strictures suffice to bind administration to law, while al-
lowing for the diversity and evolution that our institutions require.
I begin by discussing the appropriate boundaries of constitutional
law. I then review the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases.
The holdings of these cases have important consequences for gov-
ernment structure; their implications foretell additional change.
For example, recent decisions undermine theoretical support for
the special constitutional status of the independent regulatory agen-
cies by shifting power to the executive branch. After speculating
about the values that may underlie the Court's approach, I conclude
* Thompson & Knight Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas. I thank
Glen Robinson and Peter Strauss for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See generally Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (discussing constitutional relationship between
agencies and three branches of government); Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE LJ. 451 (1979) (considering roles of government branches in relation to
federal regulatory agencies).
2. See generallyJ. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978) (detailed analysis of legitimacy issues).
3. My analysis concerns domestic issues. Foreign affairs, although presenting different
issues, is unlikely to call for greater constitutional prescription.
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that the independent agencies should not enjoy broad constitutional
insulation from presidential supervision. I then analyze whether the
Reagan administration's efforts to control regulatory policymaking
in the agencies could be extended to the independent agencies. My
affirmative conclusion rests in part on the role of nonconstitutional
controls in protecting the efficacy of oversight by the other two
branches.
I. THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
The Constitution's framers left the organization of the executive
branch of government almost entirely to statutory prescription. 4
Nevertheless, the constitutional text does contain fragments from
which the President and Congress can draw support in their contest
for custody of the agencies.5 The President can note that article II
vests the "executive Power" in him,6 charges him to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,"'7 and explicitly empowers him to
require the "Opinions in writing" of department heads regarding
their duties.8 Congress can find in article I both its substantive pow-
ers to legislate and, in the "necessary and proper" clause, its author-
ization to pass laws effectuating powers vested in the other
branches. 9
Because we lack specific evidence of what the framers meant by
their stirring phrases, and because two centuries have seen vast
changes in the nation and its government, modern disputation must
infer structural prescriptions from the sparse constitutional text.
4. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 597-601 (noting meager description in article II of execu-
tive branch's organization and powers).
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting all legislative powers to Congress); id. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to make laws necessary and proper to carry into effect
powers vested by Constitution); id. art. II, § 1, cl. I (granting President executive power); id.
art. II, § 2, cd. 1 (granting President power to require written opinions from executive officers
regarding their duties); id. art. II, § 3 (granting President power to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed).
Of course, the courts also oversee the agencies, and sometimes even claim a "partnership"
relation. See Robinson, TheJudicial Role, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW: POLICY PER-
sPEc'IvEs FOR THE 1980's 415, 419-20 (G. Robinson ed. 1978) (maintaining that partnership
relation implies improperjudicial role in agency policymaking). Still, thejudicial role is theo-
retically limited to conforming agency decisions to law, as opposed to the openly political
oversight of the other two branches.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
7. Id. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
8. Id. art. II, § 3.
9. Id. art. I, § 1 (granting legislative powers to Congress); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (empow-
ering Congress to pass laws that are necessary and proper to effectuate its own powers and
those of the other branches). See generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Ina-
dental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The
Sweeping Clause", 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975) (stating that Congress may create authority
within executive and judicial branches to develop rules that facilitate their duties).
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The arguments have become familiar. Supporters of broad presi-
dential power emphasize the need to coordinate a vast federal regu-
latory apparatus and note the special political claims that flow from
the President's national constituency and his responsibility, albeit
attenuated, for the performance of the executive establishment. 10
Congressional partisans urge the need to conform administration to
substantive and procedural statutory commands, and emphasize the
undoubted presence of broad congressional power to arrange the
government. 1
A detached observer would find it hard to pick a clear winner in
these arguments. Indeed, beneath the flights of constitutional rhet-
oric lies confirmation of Madison's expectation that a scheme of sep-
arated powers would evince much scuffling for power.12 In practice,
much power is shared because of the hydraulic effect of ambition
that Madison built into the system. The Federalist Papers provide am-
ple support for the proposition that the framers contemplated con-
siderable blending of power.' 3 Yet the framers and analysts since
the Constitution's adoption have agreed that there are appropriate
limits to the sharing of power.' 4 The framers sometimes chose to
concentrate responsibility most prominently in their selection of a
single executive.' 5 Therefore, we cannot escape drawing constitu-
tional lines at some point.
Nevertheless, for several reasons the optimal level of specificity
for constitutional rules that organize the government is low. The
government is vast and diverse; perforce, even statutes that have
10. See ABA Comm. on Law and the Economy, Federal Regulation: Roads to Reform, 99
(1979) (stating that President is elected official most capable of making needed balancing
decisions on regulations, while appropriate role of Congress is to review); Bruff, supra note 1,
at 461-62 (stating that President has national constituency not shared by congressmen and
unique responsibility to oversee the execution of many statutes).
11. See 5 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1977) (recommending improved coordination among agencies and
greater congressional oversight); Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analy-
sts of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199,
1205-09 (1981) (stating that presidential control over execution of laws is purely matter of
legislative authorization).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (addressing need
to protect branches of government from encroachments by each other).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 339-42 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (citing several
state constitutions as examples).
14. See Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 1206-07 (recognizing need for full presidential con-
trol over armed forces and foreign affairs); Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of
Presidential Legislation, 40 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-16 (Summer 1976) (noting need for
rules to prevent branches from encroaching on prerogatives of others); E. CoRwIN, THE PRES-
IDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 9 (4th ed. 1957) (interpreting basic principles of sepa-
ration of powers doctrine).
15. See C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789 89 (1923) (noting im-
portance of framers' adoption of executive headed by one person).
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government-wide effect are cast in generalities. 16 Moreover, pre-
dicting the effects of rules on institutions is hazardous, even in the
short run.17 Also, the obstacles to altering constitutional rules are
considerable, even when they are generated by the courts. Not only
does constitutional ambiguity serve these needs for flexibility, it also
aids the operation of government. Mutual uncertainties about the
limits of power foster cooperation between the branches.' 8 Where
there is clarity, the incentive to compromise disappears. Perhaps
these considerations explain why the structural portions of the origi-
nal Constitution have been left almost intact since their adoption
two centuries ago.' 9
Discussion of government organization usually has normative
content, whether admitted or not. Yet the mores of constitutional
argument discourage normative debate. If constitutional parame-
ters are kept relatively simple and unconstraining, we can shift
quickly to nonconstitutional ground where we can more comforta-
bly appraise and debate how the government actually operates and
what effects various structural alternatives are likely to have. Per-
haps for these reasons, scholars usually approach the constitutional
questions cautiously. Recent essays on the separation of powers
have articulated a few modest principles closely grounded in the
text and structure of the Constitution, and have become very tenta-
tive past that point.2
0
Nevertheless, any notion that the administrative state lacks legiti-
macy because of the absence of textual authorization in the Con-
stitution is belied by the complexity and durability of the
nonconstitutional methods that have arisen to assure its account-
16. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982), is the most
prominent example.
17. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on
the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 COR-
NELL L. REv. 772, 811-15 (1974) (providing illustrative account of unanticipated effects of
constitutional jurisprudence on bureaucracies and their clients).
18. For an interesting use of game theory to explore incentives to cooperate when par-
ties bargain under conditions of uncertainty, see R. AXELROD, THE EvoLUTION OF COOPER.A-
TION (1984).
19. Four amendments have affected presidential elections, succession, and disability. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. XII (affecting procedures governing presidential elections); id. amend.
XX, § 3 (providing succession procedures for President); id. amend. XXII, § 1 (establishing
maximum period one can hold presidential office); id. amend. XXV, § 3 (establishing proce-
dures for presidential disability). The seventeenth amendment provided for the direct elec-
tion of senators. Id. amend. XVII, § 1.
20. See, e.g., McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U.L.
REv. 443 (1987); Strauss, supra note 1; Bruff, supra note 1; Rosenberg, supra note 11; Shane,
Presidential Regulatory Oversight and Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order No.
12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 1235 (1981).
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ability to the constitutional branches.2 1 The basic statutory charter
of administrative law, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
reached its fortieth anniversary without a major change. 22 The for-
mal and informal relationships between the agencies and the consti-
tutional branches confine administrative discretion, although they
do not eliminate it.23 Thus, there is no acute need to extend consti-
tutional separation of powers doctrine to legitimize and control
administration.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE SUPREME COURT
In each separation of powers case the Supreme Court must deter-
mine whether the Constitution allocates a disputed function to a
particular branch or whether the matter should be left to the contin-
uing interplay of power between the branches. 24 Recently, the
Court has been willing-sometimes apparently eager-to reach the
merits. 25 In cases that involve presidential power, the Court has
usually employed a formalist approach that reasons logically from
the constitutional text and what is known about the framers' inten-
tions. 26 The major competing approach is a functional one that as-
sesses the needs of each branch for constitutional protection of its
"core" functions.27 Functionalism therefore tends to roam further
21. See Elliot, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legisla-
tive Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 166-70 (summarizing network of legal principles and stat-
utes that manage and control administrative state).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982). See Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act,
72 VA. L. REV. 235, 237 (1986) (noting APA's resistance to significant change since its enact-
ment). There have been several amendments on the general subject of open government, but
these do not alter the APA's basic prescriptions for rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial
review. See generally G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
38-40 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act, and Sunshine Act
amendments did not change basic structure of APA).
23. See Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 246-47
(1984) (stating that administrators have discretion in shaping policy but are subject to com-
plex and distinct set of monitors).
24. For a provocative thesis that courts should regard separation of powers issues as
nonjusticiable political questions, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrT-
ICAL PROCESS (1980), reviewed by McGowan, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616, 622 (1981);
Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 296, 302-03 (1980).
25. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (providing best example of Court reaching
out to decide broad issues on merits); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(resolving numerous threshold questions before reaching executive privilege issue).
26. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186-87 (1986) (reasoning that Constitu-
tion commands that Congress play no direct role in execution of laws); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (holding that congressional vetoes violate article I of Constitution);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (holding that presi-
dential order for seizure of steel company was beyond President's constitutional powers).
27. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (finding absolute presidential immunity
from damages); Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding
congressional power to control presidential papers); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
705-06 (1974) (implying an executive privilege for presidential communications).
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from the constitutional text than does formalism.
For the Court, an important advantage of formalism is its seem-
ingly greater legitimacy. The Court can present a decision as the
natural outcome of applying the Constitution to a present day prob-
lem. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions are never free of value
judgments. For the issue at the heart of any separation of powers
controversy is identifying the government branch or officer that has
legal responsibility for substantive policymaking, or in short, who
decides? Although this question is often presented obliquely, as in
the cases on removal of administrators, it dominates the cases even
when the Court does not address it explicitly.
Recent decisions have generally promoted a unitary executive
branch under presidential direction, as opposed to a more frag-
mented executive that makes many decisions free of presidential
participation. But the Court has not seen fit to explain this impor-
tant development, or to mark its limits. After reviewing the Court's
decisions, I offer some possible reasons for its approach. I believe
that the cases contain the seeds of a coherent and workable constitu-
tional theory.
The Court's earliest principal cases involved presidential power to
remove executive officers.28 In Myers v. United States,29 the Court
held that Congress could not condition presidential removal of an
officer on the Senate's advice and consent.3 0 The Court would not
allow Congress to expand the Senate's role beyond its explicit au-
thorization to review appointments. The Court's formalist rationale
was that no branch should have implied powers to participate in
functions constitutionally assigned to another; because removal was
an executive function the Senate could not share it.31 The Court
concluded that article II granted the President an illimitable power
to remove those executive officials whom he had appointed.3 2 The
dissents rejoined that Congress has broad power to define the at-
tributes of executive offices; they questioned why removal alone
should be divorced from congressional control.33
28. The Court had already held that executive officers must obey statutory directives.
Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). That proposition is no
longer in doubt, absent a challenge by the executive to the constitutionality of the statute.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (holding that President's
seizure of steel mills was illegal because forbidden by statute).
29. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
30. Id. at 176.
31. Id at 221-22.
32. Id. at 161-64. The Court conceded that Congress could condition removal of officers
whose appointment was vested in the heads of departments; any other conclusion would have
destroyed the civil service.
33. Id. at 186 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 245-46 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The grand theorizing in the Myers opinions obscures the mundane
nature of the underlying controversy. The statutory provision in
question was part of a longstanding squabble between the branches
over control of patronage. That is why the Senate wanted to partici-
pate in the President's disposition of a relatively minor office-a
postmaster. Nevertheless, the justices wrote lengthy opinions
marked by their scholarly depth. Apparently, all regarded the case
as an accidental vehicle for an issue of great moment: the distribu-
tion of power over the executive branch between President and
Congress. The majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Taft, him-
self a former President, seemed less concerned with the limits of
patronage than with the need to prevent Congress from creating a
semipermanent bureaucracy at the highest levels, which the Presi-
dent could not displace. The Federalist Papers, in a position the Court
rejected, had contemplated that very eventuality:
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business of appoint-
ments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administra-
tion. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as
well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore,
would not occasion so violent or general a revolution in the of-
ficers of the government as might be expected, if he were the sole
disposer of offices.
34
Thus, two views of the executive branch competed for supremacy.
Taft's vision of a unitary executive led his analysis beyond remova-
bility. In dictum, he endorsed broad presidential power to super-
vise inferior officials, but did not explain why the President needed
to oversee a postmaster in order to discharge the duties of his own
great office. s 5 The reason, apparently, was that any erosion of presi-
dential dominance would create the plural executive that the fram-
ers had explicitly rejected.3 6 Taft captured his view in a syllogism:
the President possessed the executive power and the duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed; he could not exercise those
powers without subordinates; therefore, he needed plenary supervi-
sory powers over those subordinates.
37
The competing view of a more fragmented executive did extract
one concession from the majority. In a famous dictum that probably
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 484-85 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
35. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
36. The Court argued that the President "may properly supervise and guide" adminis-
trators "in order to secure that unitary and uniform executive of the laws which article II of
the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President
alone." Id.
37. Id. at 117.
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referred to existing independent agencies, the Court conceded that
Congress might be able to vest some statutory functions in inferior
officers, free of presidential interference.38 Still, the Court thought
that the President could remove such officers after the fact if dis-
pleased by their decisions. This remark foreshadowed the case that
would counterbalance Myers.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,3 9 the Court sharply limited
Myers and invented the special constitutional status of the independ-
ent regulatory agencies. The Court held that Congress could, in
creating the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), restrict the Presi-
dent to specified causes for removal of its commissioners. The
Court limited the President's plenary constitutional right of removal
to "purely executive officers," without defining that term.40 The
holding in Humphrey's Executor corrected one excess of Myers: Con-
gress should be able to forbid plenary presidential removal of
agency members whose principal duties include adjudication. Stat-
utory protections for adjudicators help to avoid contentions that in-
terference in a particular case has led to a denial of due process.
4 1
Like Myers, Humphrey's Executor is filled with broad theory that has
taken on a life of its own, divorced from the historical context in
which the case arose.42 President Roosevelt, no doubt relying on
Myers, ignored the statutory requirement for cause when he re-
moved Commissioner Humphrey. The Court's unanimous decision
condemning this action was issued the same day as its landmark in-
validation of the heart of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA).4 3 Thus, Humphrey's Executor was decided at the apogee of
the Court's hostility to the New Deal and to the nearly unconfined
executive discretion that marked administration of the NIRA.44 The
Court later accommodated the New Deal, and administrative law de-
veloped controls on the executive (for example, through the APA).
Yet some broad dicta that the Court issued in the superheated at-
mosphere of 1935 still form the constitutional basis for the in-
dependent agencies.
38. Id. at 135.
39. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
40. Id. at 631-32.
41. The Constitution itself has not been read to require such protections, perhaps be-
cause statutes so frequently supply them. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311-14 (1955)
(due process does not require complete insulation of agency adjudicator from executive
supervisor).
42. See generally Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, Yearbook 1985, 103 (re-
viewing Humphrey's Executor and calling for attention to the historical context of cases).
43. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).




The Court in Humphrey's Executor characterized agencies such as
the FTC as wholly independent of the executive branch, except for
the President's constitutional power of appointment.45 Of course,
such expansive dicta were not necessary; nor did the Court point to
any textual basis in the Constitution for its startling innovation. In-
stead, the Court distinguished independent from executive agencies
on the basis of a functional difference that does not exist. 46 The
performance of "quasi-judicial" and "quasi-legislative" functions,
which the Court thought differentiated the independent agencies,
also occurs in the executive branch.
47
In Humphrey's Executor, the Court endorsed the original goal that
Congress pursued in creating independent agencies. This goal fol-
lowed the Progressive view that regulation could be a neutral and
expert process, above the unseemly strife of politics. Consequently,
it seemed appropriate to reduce the political influence of presiden-
tial supervision to a minimum (while conveniently ignoring the
political nature of congressional oversight). Today, however, the
Progressive view seems both an impossible and an undesirable
dream. 48 Inescapably, regulation is rife with politics. Political influ-
ence fosters administrative accountability and helps to give regula-
tion its (uneasy) legitimacy. 49 Thus, the Court's theory created a
special preserve for the independent agencies that now rests on dis-
credited political science.
Myers and Humphrey's Executor leave the modern era a curious leg-
acy. The two cases, each using sweeping rhetoric, adopted radically
different views of the executive. Not surprisingly, they have since
become weapons in the continuing struggle between President and
Congress for control of the agencies. Each side cites the broad the-
ory of its favored case, torn from the generating context. 50 The
45. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
46. Id. at 631. I am not implying, however, that there are no administrative functions
deserving independence from presidential supervision. See infra section IV (recognizing that
some statutes should be so interpreted).
47. See Bruff, supra note 1, at 985 (stating that adjudication and rulemaking are functions
performed by both executive branch and independent agencies).
48. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v.
Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (suggesting that genuinely independent regulatory agencies
cannot exist and would be inconsistent with Constitution); Note, Incorporation of Independent
Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE LJ. 1766, 1771 (1985) (concluding that impossibility
of achieving neutral expertise plus normative reasons favoring accountability justify incorpo-
rating independent agencies in executive branch).
49. See generally Bruff, supra note 23, at 247 (explaining that political forces influencing
agency decisions combine to produce policies having broad public support).
50. The debate over the constitutionality of the Reagan administration's executive over-
sight program, discussed in § IV infra, illustrates this tendency. See generally Symposium, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Agency Decision-Making: An Analysis of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1195 (1981) (summarizing and evaluating the arguments of the branches).
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Court has not decisively resolved the conflict. Its modem cases
have developed their own broad theories without explicitly con-
fronting the implications of Myers and Humphrey's Executor. We are
left to infer both the present condition of those two precedents and
the Court's reasons for its recent decisions.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 51 the Court forbade Congress to appoint mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), notwithstanding
the implications of Humphrey's Executor that independent agencies
are an exclusive congressional preserve. The Court held that the
President's power to appoint "Officers of the United States" in-
cludes everyone exercising "significant authority" pursuant to stat-
ute.52  Thus the Court treated ordinary administration as
"executive" in nature, even when it is placed in an independent
agency and is performed by adjudication or rulemaking.53 The nat-
ural implication, not addressed in Buckley, is that Congress may not
exclude the President from a supervisory role because of his obliga-
tion to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
'54
On the surface, Buckley was primarily formalist. The Court began
with the text of the appointments clause, added one premise about
what officers do (exercise significant duties under public law), and
concluded that Congress could not share this power. The analysis
was functional in one sense, however, the Court distinguished activi-
ties that could only be assigned to executive officers from those that
Congress or its agents could perform (such as investigation). But
the Court did not explicitly inquire whether a core executive func-
tion was threatened. The Court could easily have written a purely
functionalist opinion because the President would have little control
of administration if Congress could place ordinary regulation in the
hands of its own agents. In Buckley, then, the choice of analytic ap-
proach probably had little effect on the outcome.
Formalism prevailed again in the landmark legislative veto case,
INS v. Chadha.55 The Court struck down all forms of the legislative
veto as inconsistent with the requirements of article I that all legisla-
tion be passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
52. Id. at 126.
53. Id. at 140-41 (finding that although rulemaking aids congressional authority to legis-
late, it is not sufficiently removed from administration tojustify infringement upon presiden-
tial power of appointment).
54. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
55. 424 U.S. 919 (1983). Under the "legislative veto," Congress conditioned delega-
tions of statutory authority by authorizing one or both of its houses to invalidate executive
implementation by passing a resolution.
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President for his signature or veto.56 The Court reasoned that a
veto resolution, like a statute, "alter[s] the legal rights . . . of per-
sons.., outside the legislative branch." 57 Because most administra-
tive activity also alters legal rights, the Court essayed a distinction:
agency action is not legislative in the constitutional sense because it
"cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it."58
Delegated authority in the executive's hands, then, is executive
power in the article II sense, and Congress can overrule it only by
statute.59
Chadha, like Buckley, undermined the theoretical basis of
Humphrey's Executor. The Court adopted a formal definition of the
boundary between legislation and execution, and forbade Congress
to control the latter through nonstatutory means. The Court would
not recognize an exception for the "quasi-legislative" function of
rulemaking.60 Nor would it allow special congressional hegemony
over the independent agencies.6 1 Thus, the Court appears to have
abandoned the functional distinctions that were advanced in
Humphrey's Executor to justify the special constitutional status of the
independent agencies.
The Court's latest decision, Bowsher v. Synar,6 2 invalidated part of
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act).63 The Act authorized the
Comptroller General to estimate budgetary deficits and to certify his
figures to the President, who was then to sequester amounts exceed-
ing the Act's targets. Although the President appoints the Comp-
troller, he is removable only by joint resolution. Accordingly,
although the President would participate in removing a Comptroller
through his opportunity to sign or veto ajoint resolution, Congress
can prevent removal by refusing to pass such a resolution. Chief
Justice Burger's formalist opinion for the Court reiterated that con-
56. See generally Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE LJ. 789 (explaining and criticizing broad sweep of
decision).
57. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
58. I at 953 n.16.
59. Id at 954-55.
60. Id. at 953 n.16.
61. In the wake of Chadha, the Court summarily affirmed decisions invalidating the appli-
cation of legislative vetoes to independent agencies. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Con-
sumer Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), aff'g Consumers Union of United
States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Nos. 82-935 & 82-1044), also aff'g Consumer
Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-
2151 & 81-2171), and denyingcert. to Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Nos. 82-177 & 82-209).
62. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
63. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of
1985 § 251, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22, 901 (Supp. III 1985).
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gressional control of execution is limited to statute.64 The Court
then equated removability of an officer to control of that officer for
constitutional purposes. Hence, the Comptroller was a congres-
sional agent and could not be assigned the executive functions of
law interpreting and fact finding that the Act contemplated. 65 The
Court distinguished Humphrey's Executor on grounds that the Presi-
dent has no power to compel removal of the Comptroller, in con-
trast to his qualified power to remove members of independent
agencies. 66 Nevertheless, the Court's central rationale, that control
follows removability for constitutional purposes, implies that the
President may supervise all executive officers in some fashion.
Not all of the Court's recent decisions have been both formalist
and theoretically inconsistent with agency independence. A deci-
sion issued the same day as Synar was neither: the Court wrote a
functional opinion that explicitly approved the existence of in-
dependent agencies, at least for adjudication. In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor,67 the Court considered whether article
III allowed an agency to exercise jurisdiction that could have been
granted to the federal courts. The Court upheld the CFTC's power
to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings in
which disgruntled customers seek redress for brokers' violations of
statutes or regulations. The Court sought guidance from the origi-
nal purpose of article III's tenure protections-to guarantee inde-
pendence from political pressure emanating from the executive or
Congress. It pleased the Court that Congress had entrusted this
function to an independent agency that would be "relatively im-
mune from the 'political winds that sweep Washington.' "68
The Court went on to ask whether the agency exercised the range
ofjurisdiction and powers normally vested only in article III courts,
and whether the latter retained the essential attributes of judicial
power. Only the CFTC's jurisdiction over counterclaims differed
from ordinary agency adjudication; the Court saw no reason to deny
agencies all pendent jurisdiction.
The Court distinguished Synar:
Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement
of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. In-
stead, the separation of powers question presented in this case is
64. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
951-59 (1983)).
65. Id. (holding that Congress had intruded into executive function).
66. Id. at 3188 n.4.
67. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
68. Id. at 3250.
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whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without apprecia-
ble expansion of its own powers, the role of the Judicial Branch. 69
This distinction may help to explain both the analytic technique and
the outcome of the cases. The aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of another usually presents a greater threat to separation of
powers values than does a possible interference with the preroga-
tives of a branch. 70 The formalist cases that I reviewed above all
presented problems of aggrandizement. The Court's response was
to draw bright lines between the functions of the branches, in an
apparent effort to prevent future erosion of the separation of
powers.
In contrast, interference cases such as Schor involve the distribu-
tion of functions within the "fourth branch" of the bureaucracy,
rather than a direct struggle between the constitutional branches.
Hence, the Court assesses the overall relationships between the
branches and the agencies to see whether the essential functions of
the branches have been preserved. 71 The functional test is far more
permissive of diverse government structure than is formalism. It is
also especially well suited to cases involving adjudicative power, as a
brief review will reveal.
Until recently, one would have thought that the issue in Schor had
been settled by Crowell v. Benson,72 which upheld the placement of
adjudicative authority in an administrative agency. Doubts arose,
however, after the controversial decision in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,73 in which a badly divided Court
held that the allocation of certain functions to bankruptcy judges
violated article III.74 Congress had created bankruptcy judges with-
out article III status, but with powers closely resembling those of
federal judges. A plurality of four justices signed a formalist opin-
ion that defined some matters as inherently judicial. Bankruptcy
matters did not come within the plurality's narrow set of exceptions
to mandatory article III jurisdiction. Two concurring justices would
have required only that removed state law claims be decided by an
article III court. The three dissenters thought that the bankruptcy
69. 106 S. Ct. at 3261.
70. See generally Strauss, Separation of Powers in Court, A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. - (1987) (forthcoming) (favoring a functional analysis that upholds arrangements that
do not present dangers of aggrandizement).
71. See generally Strauss, supra note 1 (reviewing the relations between the branches and
the agencies).
72. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
73. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
74. See generally Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline
Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 197.
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scheme satisfied a functional inquiry. They credited the legislative
interests in placing decision in an alternative forum (heavy caseloads
and a need for specialization). They found no danger that the other
branches were aggrandizing themselves at the expense of the courts
as long as the subject matter was not of special significance to the
political branches.
Schor is not the first case to limit Northern Pipeline.75 Formalism is
poorly suited to allocating adjudicative functions between courts
and agencies. It does not readily accommodate the usual arrange-
ment-primary authority in an agency, subject to the check of lim-
ited judicial review. As the Crowell Court had understood, forcing
the courts to retain potential jurisdiction sacrifices the benefits of
more informal administrative processes. Moreover, the effect may
be to diminish rather than to enhance judicial power by loading
dockets with relatively trivial matters that impede decision of the im-
portant ones.
The Court has sometimes used functional analysis in cases involv-
ing presidential power. The most prominent example is United States
v. Nixon 76 in which the Court recognized a constitutional right of
executive privilege, based on the President's need for confidential
deliberation. 77 (In Nixon the privilege was overridden, however, by
the need of the judiciary for evidence in a criminal case). Similarly,
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald78 the Court recognized an absolute presidential
immunity from damages, based on such considerations as the need
to encourage the vigorous exercise of the office.79
In these cases, the Court may have been drawn to functional anal-
ysis by the absence of pertinent constitutional text on which to base
a formalist approach.80 There were also important benefits of flexi-
bility. For both executive privilege and immunity, the Court was de-
fining the power of its own branch regarding the President.
Functional analysis allowed the Court to create protection for the
executive and to limit it at the same time.8 1 Moreover, the Court
decided these cases in the absence of statutory guidance. The func-
75. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334-39 (1985)
(upholding mandatory arbitration requirements of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(iii)).
76. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
77. Id. at 703.
78. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
79. Id. at 751-53.
80. See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977) (uphold-
ing congressional regulation of presidential papers as not unduly disruptive of executive).
81. The limitation on immunity was the Court's denial, in a companion case to Fitzgerald,
of absolute immunity for the President's closest aides. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
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tional approach avoided disabling Congress from legislating in a
way that the Court might later approve.
This view of Nixon and Fitzgerald suggests that the Court's choice
of analytic approach may be result-oriented. Formalism minimizes
the sharing of power by the branches; functionalism maximizes it.
When the Court perceives aggrandizement, it issues a formalist
opinion insisting on the separation of powers. Examples would be
Myers, Buckley, Chadha, and Synar. When the blending of power
presents no such threat, a functional opinion allows it. In addition
to the cases involving President Nixon, one could cite Humphrey's
Executor, in which the Court thought that allowing Congress to share
control of the removal of officers would prevent presidential
aggrandizement.
Hence, constitutional analysis might be improved by a direct fo-
cus on the presence or absence of aggrandizement. Assessments of
the relative power of the branches, however, are inherently subjec-
tive. For example, the New Deal Court's fear of executive arbitrari-
ness seems exaggerated today. Similarly, before Chadha there was a
spirited debate over the legislative veto: was Congress meddling in
executive matters, or imposing a necessary check on a runaway ex-
ecutive? The Chadha Court noted the debate in passing 82 and
avoided it by employing formalism. Thus, aggrandizement lies in
the eye of the beholder.
Both formalism and functionalism have serious problems of scope
and predictability. Because formalism employs syllogistic reason-
ing, there is no obvious terminus to its logic, as Myers illustrates. Its
predictability is low because the Court's underlying rationale is ob-
scure. Functional analysis, focusing on difficult and subjective fact
inquiries, also resists consistent application.83 The Court needs a
82. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
83. For example, in Synar, both Justice Stevens' concurrence and Justice White's dissent
relied on functional analysis. Justice Stevens characterized the Comptroller as an agent of
Congress not because of the removal provision but because many of his statutory powers
serve Congress. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3198 (1986). Yet he had to concede that
even the Comptroller has some powers that are typically executive in nature. Id. at n.9. What
happens to the argument if Congress increases the Comptroller's executive duties, or reduces
his congressional ones? And where do the independent agencies stand? Their functions typi-
cally are indistinguishable from those of the executive agencies, yet Congress constantly
claims them as "arms of Congress." This form of functional analysis seems plainly unwork-
able as a general approach to separation of powers issues.
Justice White asked a traditional functional question: whether the Act disrupted the Presi-
dent's capacity to exercise his constitutional functions. He thought not, principally because
the President may spend only what Congress appropriates. Id. at 3208. Yet this argument
ignores the longstanding presence of considerable presidential discretion concerning the
spending of amounts appropriated by Congress. See generally L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPEND-
ING (1975) (discussing the history and nature of presidential spending power). The Act
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criterion for decision that does not depend on imponderables and
that has sufficient legitimacy to be discussed openly in the cases. A
theory of political accountability can provide such a criterion, as I
next explain.
III. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SEPARATION
OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's recent separation of powers cases have clar-
ified political responsibility for administration. The Court has con-
sistently rejected schemes that would have given Congress power to
share in administrative decisions without full political responsibility
for doing so. If Buckley had allowed both presidential and congres-
sional appointments to regulatory agencies, neither branch would
answer for the agencies' decisions. If Chadha had upheld the legisla-
tive veto, neither branch would be solely responsible for regulation
that did take effect. If Synar had upheld the role of the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) in the Gramm-Rudman Act, it would be
difficult to identify the branch that was determining whether seques-
tration was needed.
Thus the Court's formalism may rest on a value judgment that
accountability for administration should be centered in the execu-
tive branch. Such a judgment does not necessarily answer where in
the executive authority should lie, but it does create an essentially
unitary executive with regard to Congress. Imagine the shape of the
government if Buckley, Chadha, and Synar had reached opposite re-
sults. Congress could appoint some officers and could forbid the
President to remove at least some of his appointees without a joint
resolution. All officers would act subject to legislative veto. We
would truly have "congressional government. '84
Formalism that is guided by value judgments about accountability
has the advantage of avoiding difficult fact issues. In Synar, the
Court's constitutional equation of removal power with control was
not an assertion of fact that could stand scrutiny. No one has tried
to remove a Comptroller General. Nor do Presidents readily re-
move members of the independent agencies. The Court's conclu-
sion can be understood, and justified, only as an assignment of
responsibility.
shifted much of that discretion to the Comptroller, raising the possibility of disrupting the
President's duty to execute the laws.
84. The phrase is from Woodrow Wilson's title for his 1885 book, CONGRESSIONAL Gov-




Congressional partisans might respond that under the rejected
schemes, both branches would be responsible, with the necessary
cooperation between them providing an increase in political account-
ability. I think that the Court has been silently rejecting such a
notion, and properly so. Congress was not required to endorse
executive policy in a way that carried clear responsibility. The
presence of some congressional appointees on a commission would
not tie its every action to Congress. Failure to pass a legislative veto
resolution, it was often asserted in Congress, would not endorse an
executive action, but would only indicate that it was not wholly un-
acceptable. Under the Gramm-Rudman Act, three differently com-
posed entities were to generate estimates; 85 it would be difficult to
place the final product at anyone's door. Still, it could be argued
that congressional accountability was increased under these
schemes even if it was divided with the executive. Yet any gains for
Congress were offset by losses for the executive as the ultimate re-
sponsibility for decisions became blurred. Each branch could point
to the other as the author of defective policy.
Perhaps hopes for clarity in political accountability are dashed by
the practical interdependence that permeates modem government.
Surely the Court is aware that Congress retains many avenues of
informal influence even when the formal sharing of power is forbid-
den. Examples abound. Although Congress may not displace the
President's appointment power, nominees are screened in advance
through the informal practice of senatorial courtesy.8 6 Judicial in-
validation of the legislative veto does not prevent congressional
committees from pressuring agencies in hearings and other infor-
mal ways. And notwithstanding Humphrey's Executor, the independ-
ent agencies are dependent on the executive in a myriad of ways.
Nevertheless, a scheme of independent authority that is open to in-
fluence is fundamentally different from one with shared responsibil-
ity. A branch possessing formal authority is politically accountable
for a decision no matter how vigorous outside pressure may be.
Such clarity does not exist when the power to decide is shared.
A constitutional separation of powers doctrine that emphasizes
clear accountability can be anchored in the framers' goals. The Fed-
85. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were to report jointly to the Comptroller General. 2
U.S.C. § 90 1(a) (Supp. III 1985). The Comptroller General was to review the OMB and CBO
reports and, "with due regard for the data, assumptions, and methodologies used in reaching
the conclusions set forth therein," issue a report to the President and Congress. Id. § 90 1(b).
86. Advance approval is necessary because of a Senate custom of refusing to confirm
presidential nominations when a senator of the President's party from the nominee's state is
opposed.
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eralist Papers are replete with emphasis on the need to ensure public
knowledge of accountability for particular actions.8 7 The Constitu-
tion incorporates this value most prominently in the choice of a sin-
gle executive.8 8 Moreover, the framers identified an additional
advantage in choosing a single executive: increased efficiency due to
the energy and dispatch with which a unitary executive could act.89
Thus, to the extent that authority is allocated clearly, government
efficiency increases. 90
The Court has recently employed an additional kind of formalism,
which I will call procedural formality to distinguish it from the
Court's formalist style of logical reasoning. A number of recent
cases, most prominently Chadha, have required Congress to act
through full, formal legislative procedures to control the execu-
tive.9 1 Accountability values may also explain this procedural for-
mality. The political responsibility of members of Congress is
mostly individual. True, each may bear some diffuse liability for the
performance of the institution as a whole, but the record of individ-
ual actions certainly dominates reelection campaigns. Indeed, in-
cumbents often run against Congress. Consequently, Congress is
accountable as a branch of government only when it acts as a whole
in legislation.
Procedural formality not only conforms congressional power to
accountability; it also influences the congressional product. The
Constitution's procedural requisites for legislation ameliorate the
effects of faction and localized constituencies, and foster policy that
advances the public interest.92 Thus the Madisonian goal of diluting
special interest influence is advanced by procedural formality.
The legislative veto was inconsistent with several of these values.
First, insofar as the veto mechanism gave the committees effective
87. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 456 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (arguing that
with multiple executive, restraints of public opinion "lose their efficacy, as well on account of
the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
uncertainty on whom it ought to fall").
88. See generally Martin, The Legislative Veto and The Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power,
68 VA. L. REV. 253, 279 (1982) (Constitutional Convention recognized that accountability
depends largely upon public clarity about responsibility for particular actions).
89. Id. at 286 (claiming Constitutional Convention chose single executive rather than
council because it viewed structure as more conducive to effective governance).
90. These efficiency gains, however, are at the cost of lessened informal cooperation
between the branches.
91. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (requiring congressional authority to be
exercised only by bicameral passage followed by presentment to President); see also Bruff,
supra note 23, at 222-26 (reviewing other formalist cases); Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181,
3189 (1986) (analogizing congressional control of execution through the Comptroller Gen-
eral to legislative veto).
92. See Bruff, supra note 23, at 219 (noting that framers conditioned legislation on con-
currence of institutions with differing representative bases in response to faction problem).
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control over executive action, it conferred power on groups having
no separate political responsibility of their own. Second, special in-
terests could more readily dominate in a more confined arena.93 In
addition, this fragmentation of power decreased efficiency by foster-
ing impasse when committees disagreed.
If the Court had employed functional analysis in these cases, it
might not have drawn clear lines of accountability. Focusing only
on whether a branch is disrupting the core functions of another
would result in a much more mixed set of outcomes' than does for-
malism. For example, it is not apparent why the President must ap-
point all officers if he is to discharge his own duties. Indeed, the
function of regulating elections, which was involved in Buckley, may
be inappropriate for presidential supervision. Nor do all legislative
vetoes appear to invade central presidential responsibilities. The
one involved in Chadha concerned the deportability of individual
aliens. Functional analysis might allow the veto in that context but
might invalidate one that controlled the President's disposition of
the armed forces.
94
This analysis suggests that formalist pursuit of accountability may
sacrifice needed limits to presidential power. Yet rejecting the frag-
mented executive of Humphrey's Executor does not necessarily entail
embracing the unitary executive of Myers. Limitations to constitu-
tional formalism can be articulated. They flow from the nature of
the President's responsibility for administration.
Consider the President's accountability for the actions of his
direct subordinates in the Cabinet. Although the President's for-
tunes may rise or fall with their cumulative actions, the President
cannot participate in every policy decision made within his adminis-
tration. His responsibility, then, is generalized. For this reason, the
President's relationship with the agencies is basically one of over-
sight, and is similar to that of Congress. Therefore, constitutional
doctrine needs to preserve only a generalized presidential power of
supervision over the agencies, concomitant with his political respon-
sibility for them. I next elaborate this concept.
Presidential accountability flows from several sources. First, it
comes from the power to appoint.95 Even when the President may
93. Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1413 (1977) (legislative veto allowed special interest groups to
affect policy outside public rulemaking procedures).
94. See Strauss, supra note 56 (distinguishing the Chadha context from others in which
veto addresses vital separation of powers relationships, and suggesting its greater appropriate-
ness for the latter).
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 2 (authorizing President to appoint ambassadors,
Supreme Court justices, and other public officials).
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neither remove nor supervise particular officers, such as federal
judges, he hears direct criticism when a nomination is made, and
suffers the judgments of history for the behavior of his nominees in
office. Second, the addition of removal authority96 dramatically in-
creases presidential responsibility, expanding it from an ex ante judg-
ment about qualifications to a continuing appraisal of fitness to
remain in office. Obviously, the possession of plenary removal au-
thority maximizes the President's accountability because it closely
ties the officer to him. Third, the President's accountability stems
from his supervision of the agencies, and the public's subsequent
appraisal of the results.97 Both formal supervisory powers found in
statutes (such as budgetary powers) and more informal presidential
initiatives are relevant here. This aspect of presidential accountabil-
ity is not constant; it varies over time and by subject matter. Thus,
the Reagan administration's aggressive efforts to supervise poli-
cymaking in the agencies increase the President's responsibility for
agency decisions.
Constitutional doctrine need not specify the exact nature of the
President's fluctuating supervisory powers. It is enough to preserve
the three aspects described above, to a degree that depends on the
nature of political responsibility in the context. For example, as My-
ers recognized, the President should retain plenary removal power
over some officers, such as the Secretary of State. In contrast, be-
cause the President's political responsibility for some functions
(such as adjudication) is low, his supervisory powers may be re-
stricted accordingly. This last observation suggests a rationale for
the Court's usual decision of the cases involving article III functions
according to a permissive functional analysis. Absent any need to
preserve presidential responsibility for adjudication, Congress is
free to allocate it to court or agency within broad limits.
Constitutional doctrine should assume that primary responsibility
for particular administrative decisions is where the statutes place
it-with the agencies. That assumption will leave the policing of
those decisions, and of most aspects of oversight relations with Con-
gress and the executive, to nonconstitutional doctrines. This is not
to say, however, that political responsibility ends at the White
House gates. If an agency decision is important enough, an officer
may be fired for sufficiently displeasing the President. More com-
monly, however, the structure of our government and the nature of
96. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (indicating source of presidential
power to remove subordinate executive officials).
97. See id. at 117 (indicating source of presidential power to supervise agencies).
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modem administrative law ensure agency responsibility. The agen-
cies are overseen by all three constitutional branches and by interest
groups. Administrators, far from being insulated, are subject to re-
wards and punishments from these diverse overseers. Recent ad-
ministrative law has attempted to open the agencies to these
influences and to bind their final decisions to law. Obviously, there
are some difficulties in achieving both these goals simultaneously.
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the tensions.
In Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,98 the
Court allowed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to re-
verse preexisting policy in favor of an approach that met the effi-
ciency criteria of the Reagan administration.99 In doing so, the
Court endorsed the traditional doctrine that courts should defer to
agency interpretations of statutes within the limits of reason and as-
certainable legislative intent.100 The Court may have expanded the
doctrine significantly, however, by disapproving broad judicial anal-
ysis of implied statutory purpose as a means of confining agency
discretion. Instead, the Court limited itself to a search for specific
congressional intent on the issue at hand and, failing to find it, left
interstitial policy entirely to the agency. Therefore, if Congress
wishes to confine executive discretion, it had best do so explicitly.
The Chevron Court emphasized that regulation may respond to the
policy preferences of the incumbent administration, within statutory
limits. This explicit endorsement of the role of politics in regulation
is inconsistent with the premise of Humphrey's Executor that regula-
tion and politics should not mix. Thus, the modem Court appears
to be promoting accountability through administrative law as well as
separation of powers doctrine.' 0 '
Chevron, however, is in some tension with the Court's earlier deci-
sion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co. 102 The Court invalidated the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) attempt to conform its
policy to administration goals by rescinding its passive restraints
regulation. 10 3 One can reconcile these cases on grounds that in
State Farm, the agency insufficiently explained the factual and policy
reasons for its action, whereas in Chevron the agency passed that test.
98. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally StarrJudicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE
J. ON REG. 283 (1986).
99. Id. at 865.
100. Id. at 866.
101. See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. LAW,
ECON. & ORG. 81, 93-95 (1985) (asserting that Chevron promotes accountability).
102. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
103. Id. at 57.
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Nevertheless, by endorsing active judicial review of an agency's sup-
port for any change in the regulatory status quo, the State Farm
Court slowed administrative efforts to alter existing regulations. 04
Under State Farm, the courts, using doctrines of judicial review
that are essentially a common law gloss on the vague terms of the
APA, force agencies to explain policy changes thoroughly. 05 This
style of review encourages regulators to respond substantively to
the needs of groups that benefit from regulation. 06 For example,
much health and safety regulation benefits the general public or a
close surrogate. Focusing judicial review on the factual and policy
support for an agency's action tends to drive regulation toward serv-
ing the public interest.
Thus, both Chevron and State Farm can be read to promote the ac-
countability of administrative action, although in somewhat different
senses of that term. The problem is to reconcile an agency's rela-
tionship with the executive and its statutory responsibilities to the
public. In Sierra Club v. Costle,107 the court thought it sufficient to
require administrators to justify their decisions on the administra-
tive record before them, whatever the content of consultation with
the White House.108 This compromise seems sound. It allows gen-
eralized executive oversight, but assigns specific responsibility for
administration to the agencies.
Now let us consider the independent agencies. The President's
qualified removal power carries formal responsibility for a minimum
level of performance by these officers. Yet in practice, both Presi-
dents and Congress have treated these agencies in accordance with
the dicta in Humphrey's Executor as entities outside the executive
branch, whose officers the President does not supervise and is
loathe to fire. There are some exceptions to this characterization in
which informal presidential pressure has influenced an independent
agency's policy or hastened the departure of a member. In general,
104. Id. at 40-41. See generally Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup.
CT. REv. 177 (assessing implications of State Farm for administrative law).
105. State Farm's approval of active judicial review of the substance of policymaking con-
flicts with the Court's approach in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), in which the court forbade lower courts
to require agencies to follow procedures not imposed by statute. See Stewart, Vermont Yan-
kee and the Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1816-17 (1978) (indicat-
ing that Supreme Court's earlier recognition of record requirement not found in APA for
informal proceedings conflicts with Court's condemnation of imposition of procedural for-
malities not required by APA).
106. See Bruff, supra note 23, at 210 (examining interest representation theory requiring
agencies to explain resolution of policy issues by demonstrating consideration of interested
groups' views).
107. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 404-08.
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however, Congress is jealous of its hegemony of these agencies, and
Presidents have found it wise to assent.
In both theory and practice, independent agencies report to Con-
gress. Consider the consequences in terms of political responsibil-
ity. All agencies report to Congress in the sense that they must
abide by the statutes that authorize their programs and appropriate
their funds. Beyond these statutory functions, however, Congress
does not act as a whole. Congressional oversight is performed by
authorizing and appropriations committees in both houses, and by
individual members of Congress. In short, there is no single elected
officer to whom the independent agencies are accountable. In this
sense, they truly are the "headless fourth branch" of government.10 9
One can argue that administrative law and the oversight of Con-
gress, the courts, and the interest groups produce enough accounta-
bility for the independent agencies, so that their constitutional
insulation from the President should remain. It is not sufficient to
say, however, that the independent agencies are responsible for fol-
lowing their statutes. Nor is the added influence of executive over-
sight unnecessary or pernicious. As Chevron and State Farm illustrate,
statutory compliance usually leaves open a broad range of policy
choices. The independent agencies encounter uncoordinated and
possibly inconsistent oversight from a number of sources, including
various committees and members of Congress. Such diverse over-
sight tends to destabilize agency policymaking."10 In contrast, exec-
utive oversight can be unitary and consistent because of the
hierarchical organization of the executive branch. Presidential par-
ticipation can serve a beneficial role in policy coordination. In any
event, the President's political base adds to the various influences
on an agency. The outcome is a gain in total accountability, as long
as executive oversight does not dictate policy, but rather leaves the
final decision with the agency. Thus, if executive oversight can be
controlled, I see no reason to exempt the independent agencies
from its influence.
Viewed in this light, the special constitutional status of the in-
dependent agencies is unjustifiable. The Supreme Court should re-
pudiate the dicta in Humphrey's Executor that account for it. That
would not, however, identify the limits of permissible presidential
109. For the origin of this term, see PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGE-
MENT, REPORT OF THE COMMrIrEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1937) (examining role and function of
independent agencies within federal government as part of study on reorganization).
110. See Bruff, supra note 23, at 231 (indicating that inconsistent signals to agencies from
committees reduce stability of administrative policymaking).
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supervision of decisions by independent agencies, because those
limits are unknown even for executive agencies. For constitutional
purposes, it is sufficient to say that the executive branch is unitary in
the sense that the President bears generalized responsibility for all
of the agencies. The consequence of such a stance would be to pre-
vent Congress from denying the President a supervisory role that is
appropriate to the function involved. The details of allocating re-
sponsibility for particular decisions between the presidency and the
agencies can then be resolved by nonconstitutional doctrine.
IV. OVERSIGHT IN ACTION: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S
EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
Constitutional rudiments do not specify the extent to which the
President may oversee policy formation in the agencies, whether the
agencies are independent or not. Instead, statutory and informal
arrangements dominate everyday life. Because Congress has not yet
attempted to define by statute the extent of permissible presidential
supervision of the agencies, except insofar as removal restrictions
imply limits, it is the informal interplay of power between the
branches that dominates. Here, there is ample opportunity for the
President to seize the initiative presented by statutory interstices.
The President can employ informal methods of supervision, or can
create more enduring institutional relationships by the relatively
formal method of an executive order.1 1 Congress, in turn, is left to
respond formally, by statutory authorization or restriction of the
President's activities, or informally, by oversight inquiry. The latter
method, decentralized congressional oversight, usually constitutes a
real political check because at least one house of Congress is usually
controlled by the party not holding the White House. Of course,
there are efficiency losses in the resulting interplay, but everything
costs something.
The Reagan administration has made unparalleled efforts to cen-
tralize executive oversight of agency policymaking. Executive Order
No. 12,291 commanded executive agencies (but not independent
ones) to apply cost-benefit analyses to proposed regulations, and to
issue only optimally beneficial final regulations. 112 The Office of
I 11. See Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 14, at 1 (assessing value of executive order as
policymaking tool).
112. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1982).
See generally Shane, supra note 20 (assessing facial legality of Executive Order No. 12, 291 and




Management and Budget (OMB) was authorized to review both
stages of the process. Executive Order No. 12,498 required the
same agencies to undergo OMB review of their regulatory agendas
at an early stage.1 3 Both orders recognize that regulation contains
political value judgments as well as technical determinations."
4
Therefore, the orders shift power up the bureaucratic chain, away
from technocrats in agency staff components and toward political
appointees at the head of the agencies and in OMB. 1 5
Presidential oversight tends to be much less visible than most
forms of congressional oversight, due to the cloak of executive privi-
lege. Although the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right
of executive privilege in United States v. Nixon," 6 the Court did not
address the nature of the privilege as it applies to congressional de-
mands for information. Nixon, however, gave legitimacy to claims of
privilege in all contexts because the privilege rests on privacy needs
in the deliberative process that are present regardless of the source
of an outside inquiry. Congressional committees seeking informa-
tion about presidential supervision of the agencies must reckon with
the existence of a constitutional privilege of unknown scope.
Hence, the committees, striving to discover the content of executive
oversight, wrestle with the executive in informal negotiations and,
to date, in inconclusive litigation." 17 The committees stress the dan-
ger that the White House may secretly pressure the agencies into
subverting statutory commands.
A response that minimizes the need for constitutional determina-
tions is to control executive oversight, not to forbid it. The Ameri-
113. Exec. Order No. 12,498,3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). See generally Note, Presidential Policy Management of Agency Rules Under Reagan
Order 12,498, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 63 (1986) (discussing enhancement of presidential power by
Executive Order No. 12,498 and concluding that this increased authority cannot be main-
tained under article II of Constitution).
114. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE LJ. 1395, 1399
(1975) (pointing out that regulatory agencies make political decisions between competing so-
cial and economic values).
115. See generally Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemak-
ing, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181 (1986) (examining role of presidential supervision in regulatory
process and issues raised by Executive Orders No. 12,291 and No. 12,498); Olson, The Quiet
Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemak-
zng Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA.J. NAT. RESOURCEs L. 1 (1984) (study of OMB review of
EPA rules under Executive Order No. 12,291, suggesting establishment of independent regu-
latory review process).
116. 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
117. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Constitution deliberately left allocation of powers between congressional and executive
branches unclear in some circumstances to promote negotiation between two branches);
United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983) (withholding
declaratory judgment concerning executive privilege as defense for withholding documents
from Congress).
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can Bar Association (ABA) has recommended that Executive Orders
No. 12,291 and No. 12,498 be extended to the independent agen-
cies.I1 8 As a primary control on the process, however, the ABA rec-
ommended that OMB-agency policy communications that might
otherwise be shielded by executive privilege be made available to
Congress. That could check potential abuses, to the extent that pol-
icy consultations are written. Consistency of policy with statutory
commands would be promoted by exposing reasons for decisions
that are not legally permissible. New fact and policy arguments ap-
pearing in executive oversight could be channelled into the adminis-
trative record.
If the President declines to disclose OMB-agency communica-
tions, I think Congress could require it as a condition of oversight.
Constitutional executive privilege does not need to be extended
from the precincts of the Oval Office throughout the executive
branch to allow the President to perform his constitutional duties.
If his major oversight relationship with the agencies is a generalized
one, such as that embodied in the Reagan executive orders, disclo-
sure should not chill permissible communications. At the same
time, disclosure may be necessary to prevent executive oversight
from overriding all other influences on the agency and shifting spe-
cific policy decisions into the White House.
Exposing the independent agencies to presidential oversight
methods that are used for the executive agencies would reflect a
parity principle: either both branches should be able to oversee a
regulatory function, or neither. 119 Such a principle can recognize
that adjudication needs protection from political oversight. More-
over, it allows for identification of particular rulemaking or enforce-
ment functions that should not be subject to normal kinds of
political oversight by either branch, such as campaign regulation or
monetary policymaking.
These modest alterations in doctrine would replace the broad
constitutional insulation from executive oversight that derives from
dicta in Humphrey's Executor with a much more limited protection
from the President. The legality of a particular kind of oversight
would depend not on the name of the agency but on the nature of
118. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 115, at 203 (examining ABA recommendation and
suggesting that law and policy considerations support extension of executive orders to in-
dependent agencies).
119. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 668-69 (indicating that parity is not complete because
balance can be maintained only by ensuring Congress' right to structure government and
President's right to control it).
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an affected function and a judgment whether oversight would so im-
pair it as to be inconsistent with the authorizing statute.
Some troubling features of oversight under the current executive
orders flow from difficulties in monitoring it through judicial review.
Agency action that evades judicial review can be shaped to the needs
of special interests more readily than can relatively formal agency
decisions of the kind involved in Chevron and State Farm.120 Under
the executive orders, claims of executive privilege may impede judi-
cial fact finding. Oversight occurs early in the policymaking process
when courts are reluctant to intervene. 12' Decisions involve broad
questions of priority that the courts avoid. 122 The outcome of over-
sight is often agency inaction, which courts have long found difficult
to control. 123 Thus, it is likely that most aspects of oversight pursu-
ant to the executive orders will prove unreviewable. The impedi-
ments to judicial review reinforce the conclusion that executive
privilege should not bar all congressional monitoring.
Congress could legislate controls on executive oversight on a gov-
ernment-wide or a program-by-program basis. The constitutional
limits of congressional power could remain largely undefined. Now
that the Court has guaranteed that the President may appoint execu-
tive officers and may remove them under at least some circum-
stances, powers of supervision could vary substantially without
compelling a constitutional conclusion that the President has been
denied supervisory authority commensurate with his generalized
political accountability.
120. In Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984), the Court held that
judicial review of milk marketing orders at the behest of consumers was impliedly precluded
by a statute that was enacted for the principal benefit of milk producers. Id. at 351-52. Many
statutes, like the one involved in Community Nutrition, benefit special interests, but make a bow
toward more widespread interests. Precluding ordinary judicial review of their administration
only increases existing "capture" problems.
121. Doctrines of finality, ripeness, and exhaustion codify this reluctance. See generally R.
PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.7 (1985) (examining
timing ofjudicial review of agency action).
122. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court denied standing to black parents
to challenge IRS enforcement policy concerning denial of tax exemptions for discriminatory
private schools. Id at 750-52. Although based on standing doctrine, the decision probably
owes more to the difficulties ofjudicial monitoring of levels of enforcement activity.
123. In Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985), the Court held that decisions not to
take enforcement action are presumptively unreviewable, in part due to the difficulties of re-
viewing agency priority setting. Id at 1651.
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